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INTRODUCTION

Affirmative action has always been one of the most controversial topics
in civil rights law-except within the domain of private employment, which is
governed exclusively by Title VII (as opposed to the Equal Protection Clause
of the Constitution).' Within the Title VII space, we have a very different
situation. The Supreme Court has been silent on the substantive standards for
affirmative action under Title VII for more than half of the life of the statute.
UnitedSteelworkers v. Weber2 was decided in 1979. Johnson v. Transportation
AnBryce Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. This Article is based on
*
a presentation at the New York University School of Law 67th Annual Labor Conference, June
6, 2014, and is a lightly revised version of that presentation as published. See Deborah C.
Malamud, The Strange Persistence of Affirmative Action Under Title VII, in ANNE MARIE
LOFASO, TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AFTER 50 YEARS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK
UNIVERSITY 67TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR (LexisNexis Publishing forthcoming 2015). I
thank my research assistant, Alok Nadig, for his thoughtful comments.
I

Note that the focus of this Article is Title VII; this Article does not survey federal-

contractor practice under the administration of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance. For a
general treatment of federal contractor affirmative action compliance under Executive Order
11246, see BARBARA T. LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
2567-2603 (C. Geoffrey Weirich et al. eds., 4th ed. 2007).
2
443 U.S. 193 (1979). Weber dealt with

1
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Agency 3 was decided in 1987. That was the Court's last word on the substantive
standards for affirmative action under Title VII, and that was 28 years ago.
It is not only the Supreme Court that has been silent. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) last promulgated guidelines on
affirmative action in 1979, before the Supreme Court decided Weber. It has
done nothing since. Congress included no provisions on affirmative action in
the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Some sloppy languafe led commentators to
suggest that the Act put affirmative action at risk, but that has not been
reflected in the case law.
There is certainly a need for fresh legal guidance. In the years since
Weber and Johnson, there has been a sea change in the actual practice of
affirmative action in corporate America. The original rationale for affirmative
action under Title VII was remedial. The diversity rationale currently in use is
not.
I argue in Part II that affirmative action was understood by the Court in
Weber and Johnson to be remedial in nature: It was aimed at remedying an
imbalance caused by race or gender discrimination in labor markets. I show in
Part III that the diversity rationale that dominates corporate affirmative-action
advocacy today does not appear to be remedial in this sense. Its benchmark is
the global marketplace-not the local labor market. Part III closely examines
opinions by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor (the author of Grutter v. Bollinger)
and concludes that it is not safe to read Grutter as an endorsement by Justice
O'Connor of this corporate diversity rationale. Part III then turns to Justice
Anthony Kennedy (the key swing vote on the current Court) and concludes that
he would oppose an extension of Weber and Johnson to diversity-based
corporate affirmative action. Part IV goes beyond the particulars of the
jurisprudence of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy to review the way the current
Court would likely view both remedial and diversity-based affirmative action
[t]he legality of an affirmative action plan-collectively bargained by an
employer and a union-that reserve[d] for black employees 50% of the
openings in an in-plant craft-training program until the percentage of black
craft-workers in the plant [was] commensurate with the percentage of blacks
in the local labor force.
Id. at 197.
480 U.S. 616 (1987). In Johnson, the Court stated:
In selecting applicants for the promotional position of road dispatcher, the
Agency, pursuant to [its Affirmative Action] Plan, passed over petitioner
Paul Johnson, a male employee, and promoted a female employee applicant,
Diane Joyce. The question for decision [was] whether in making the
promotion the Agency impermissibly took into account the sex of the
applicants ....
Id. at 619.
4
See, e.g., Don Munro, Note, The Continuing Evolution of Affirmative Action Under Title
VII. New DirectionsAfter the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 81 VA. L. REv. 565, 590-601 (1995).
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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under Title VII. After considering some mitigating factors, Part V concludes
that even if remedial affirmative action were to survive through the operation of
stare decisis, the Court's discomfort with it will likely lead the Court to reject
the extension of Weber andJohnson to diversity-based affirmative action.
II. REMEDIAL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION UNDER TITLE VII

The plan in Weber, the Court said, had "purposes [that] mirror those of
the statute." 6 Both were "designed to break down old patterns of racial
segregation and hierarchy." 7 Both were structured to "open employment
opportunities for Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally closed
to them." 8 The role of affirmative action was to allow employers to respond to
a "manifest imbalance" in the racial/gender composition of their workforce
when compared to some relevant labor market, with success measured in terms
of labor market characteristics.9 So in Weber, where unskilled workers were to
be given apprenticeship training, the comparison was between "the percentage
of black skilled craftworkers" in the employer's plant and "the percentage of
blacks in the local labor force."o
Furthermore, when the Court in Weber referred to "old patterns of
and hierarchy" or to the use of affirmative action to
segregation
racial
"eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job
categories,"" the Court was talking about circumstances in which
discrimination (albeit not necessarily by the defendant employer) was the
source of that imbalance. There, the employer "hired as craftworkers only
persons who had had prior craft experience. Because blacks had lonf been
excluded from craft unions, few were able to present such credentials."' What
followed was a footnote documenting judicial, administrative, and social
13
scientific findings on discrimination by craft unions. Thus, while the Court
did not insist that the discrimination at issue even arguably had been caused by

6

Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.

7

Id.
Id.

8

See LINDEMANN & GRossMAN, supra note 1, at 2525-26 (discussing use of labor market
9
comparisons in the "manifest imbalance" inquiry).
1o
Weber, 443 U.S. at 208-09.
"
Id.
12
13

Id. at 198.
Id. at 198 n.1.
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the particular employer, 14 it was plain that discrimination was at the root of the
problem. This is what "traditionally segregated" meant in Weber.' 5
Johnson was similar to Weber in that it involved skilled craft jobs. The
case involved gender rather than race and arose in California rather than the
Deep South, and so the connotations of calling the skilled craft jobs at issue
"traditionally segregated" were different. Nonetheless, the similarities in these
cases outweigh the differences. As in Weber, the Court in Johnson explained
that there must be an imbalance based on an appropriate labor market
comparison (with Johnson clarifying that "where a job requires special training,
the comparison should be with those in the labor force who possess the relevant
qualifications"-as would also be the case if the issue were proof of
discrimination).' 6 And while the Court made very clear that it was not adopting
a standard that required prima facie proof that the particular employer in
question violated Title VII, it also made clear that it was using the requirement
of a "traditionally segregated job category" to assure that affirmative action
was being used "consistent with Title VII's purpose of eliminating the effects
of employment discrimination .... " The Court noted, in Johnson, that the
employer's Affirmative Action Plan cited the "limited opportunities that have
existed in the past for [women] to work" in skilled craft positions 8 and
concluded that it was "as a result" of those limited opportunitiesl 9 that "women
were concentrated in traditionally female jobs in the Agency, and represented a
lower percentage in other job classifications than would be expected if such
traditional segregation had not occurred." 20 While in Weber the traditional
segregation was of black men into the ghetto of unskilled labor and in Johnson
it was of [white] women into the pink-collar ghetto of office and clerical work,

.

14
See id. at 211-14 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (expounding on this "arguable violation"
theory, which the Court did not adopt).
15
See id. at 212 ("The sources cited suggest that the court considers a job category to
be
'traditionally segregated' when there has been a societal history of purposeful exclusion of blacks
from the job category, resulting in a persistent disparity between the proportion of blacks in the
labor force and the proportion of blacks among those who hold jobs within the category."); id. at
212 n.* ("There can be little doubt that any lack of skill [in the black population] has its roots in
purposeful discrimination of the past, including segregated and inferior trade schools for blacks
in Louisiana, . . . traditionally all-white craft unions in that State, . . . [false] union nepotism, . .
and segregated apprenticeship programs." (citations omitted)).
16
Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 632 (1987) (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) (holding, in a pattem-or-practice context, that the proper
comparison in determining underrepresentation in teaching positions was the percentage of
blacks in the employer's work force with the percentage of qualified black teachers in the area
labor force)).
17
18
19
20

Id.
Id. at 621, 634.
Id. at 634.
Id.
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both cases were seen by the Court as involving past discrimination that limited
21
employment opportunity.
In his concurrence in Johnson, Justice Stevens wrote that remedial
justifications were not the only acceptable ones, saying that affirmative action
under Title VII might be valid "for any reason that might seem sensible from a
business or social point of view." 22 But no one else joined that opinion. Indeed
Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence in the judgment, expressly disagreed with
it, reiterating Weber's invocation of the manifest imbalance standard as tied to
the statutory "purpose of eliminating the effects of employment
discrimination." 2 3
III. TODAY'S CORPORATE "DIVERSITY" AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

Unlike in Weber and Johnson, the dominant rationale for affirmative
action under Title VII today is "diversity," with a business-utilitarian spin that
one commentator has called "racial realism" and another-more
provocatively-"racial capitalism." 2 4 Under the diversity rationale, employers
seek to increase the representation of members in underrepresented groups not
with reference to the "balance" that would exist absent discrimination
(measured by some relationship to a relevant labor market), but rather with
reference to one of any number of business goals their presence is said to serve.
Take as an example the Fortune-100 brief 5 submitted to the Supreme
Court in Fisher v. University of Texas 26 (the Court's most recent highereducation affirmative action case), which echoed the briefs filed by major
corporations in support of affirmative action in the University of Michigan
21
In both Weber and Johnson, there were intimations that the employer might itself be
vulnerable to suit under Title VII. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 210 (1979)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (disparate impact); Johnson, 480 U.S. at 656 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (pattern-or-practice). But the Court did not rely on them.
22
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 645 (Stevens, J., concurring).
23
Id. at 650 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Richard N. Appel et al.,
Affirmative Action in the Workplace: Forty Years Later, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 549
(2005).
24
See Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARv. L. REv. 2151, 2152-55 (2013) (defining
"racial capitalism" as the use by whites and white institutions of "nonwhite people to acquire
social and economic value" and critiquing it as an "instrumental view" that is "antithetical to a
view of nonwhiteness-and race more generally-as a personal characteristic intrinsically
deserving of respect"). See generally JOHN D. SKRENTNY, AFTER CIVIL RIGHTS: RACIAL REALISM
IN THE NEw AMERICAN WORKPLACE (2014) (discussing "racial realism"). For a history of the
corporate "rebranding [of] equal opportunity as diversity management," see FRANK DOBBIN,
INVENTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 133-60 (2009).
25
Brief for Amici Curiae Fortune-100 and Other Leading American Businesses in Support
of Respondents, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345), 2012 WL
3418831.
26
133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
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affirmative action cases in 2003.27 According to this brief, diversity is needed
to serve "the multi-cultural [domestic] consumer today[, who] is over a third of
the population, and 80 percent of the population growth." 2 8 Diversity will aid
the rapid American corporate expansion into the global marketplace, which is
the source of more than 55% of the total income earned by S&P 500 firms.29
Furthermore, we are told, difficult economic times put a premium on creativity
that cannot be achieved by homogeneous groups.30 In sum, the brief argues,
diversity is needed for "increased sales revenue, more customers, greater
market share, and greater relative profits."3 1
For all of these years during which diversity-based affirmative action
practice has become "the new black" in the corporate setting (so to speak),
there has been no Supreme Court case law approving it. The closest the
Supreme Court has ever come to dealing with the question of whether
"diversity" is an acceptable basis for affirmative action under Title VII was in
1996-19 years ago, now-in Taxman v. Board of Education.32 That case,
which raised the question of "diversity" in the potentially incendiary context of
a layoff decision, so scared civil rights advocates that they "encouraged" its

See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
For corporate briefs cited by the Court in Grutter, see Brief of General Motors Corporation as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02516), 2003 WL 399096 (arguing that affirmative action in higher education is needed to assure
"racial and ethnic diversity in the pool of employment candidates from which the Nation's
businesses can draw their future leaders . . . [and] to obtain the manifold benefits of diversity in
the managerial levels of their work forces," which is needed to protect "the ability of American
businesses to utilize fully the opportunities of the global market") and Brief for Amici Curiae 65
Leading American Businesses in Support of Respondents at 7, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
(Nos. 02-241, 02-516), 2003 WL 399056 (citing global sales and arguing that "a racially diverse
group of managers with cross-cultural experience is better able to work with business partners,
employees, and clientele in the United States and around the world").
28
Brief for Amici Curiae Fortune-100, supra note 25, at 8 (quoting William J. Holstein,
Diversity Is Even More Important in Hard Times, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, at B2).
29
Id. at8-9.
30
Id at 12.
31
Id. at 10 (quoting Cedric Herring, Does Diversity Pay?: Race, Gender, and the Business
Casefor Diversity, 74 AM. Soc. REv. 208, 219 (2009)).
32
91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 521 U.S. 1117 (1997), cert. dismissed, 522
U.S. 1010 (1997). In Taxman, the school board decided to reduce the size of the business
department of Piscataway High School, a school with a racially balanced teacher workforce. Id.
at 1551. The choice of whom to lay off came down to two teachers of equal seniority and merit.
Id. One teacher (Taxman) was white, the other (Williams) was black-and the sole minority
teacher in the business department. Id. Pursuant to its affirmative action policy, the school board
laid off Taxman, citing its desire for a "diverse" work force at the departmental level. Id. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, held that Title VII does not
permit "an employer with a racially balanced work force to grant a non-remedial racial
preference in order to promote 'racial diversity."' Id. at 1549-50.
27
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settlement.33 The result was dismissal while the case was pending before the
Court.
If "diversity" as a basis for employer affirmative action (in principle
and as practiced) is a "looming battlefield," as one pair of commentators
recently put it, 34 it is a deadly quiet one at present. Unlike the case of
affirmative action in higher education, there is no conservative public interest
group making Title VII affirmative action its cause cdljbre. No state initiatives
have used state law to target the practices of private-sector employers.35 Nor are
there many, if any, high-profile individual discrimination suits in which private
corporations have used their "diversity" programs as a defense to individual
36
claims of discrimination by disgruntled white/male job- or promotion-seekers.
Why the silence? The leading argument is that Justice O'Connor's
opinion for the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger37 tied the benefits of highereducation diversity to the needs of the corporate world in a manner that
essentially embraced corporate diversity-based affirmative action.38 Justice

For a discussion of the settlement in Taxman, see Lisa Estrada, Buying the Status Quo on
33
Affirmative Action: The Piscataway Settlement and Its Lessons About Interest Group Path
Manipulation, 9 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTs. L.J. 207 (1999). Taxman was a case on awful facts, to
be sure, in part because it involved a layoff decision rather than a hiring decision. But what was
scariest about the case was that it threatened to present the "diversity" issue in a less-than-ideal
posture.
Corey A. Ciocchetti & John Holcomb, The Frontier of Affirmative Action: Employment
34
Preferences & Diversity in the Private Workplace, 12 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 283, 284 (2010)
(proposing a Grutter-based justification for diversity-based, non-remedial, voluntary privatesector preference programs, but saying it is not likely to get five votes).
If they did so, it is unlikely that the preemptive force of Title VII would stand in the way.
35
See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 710-11 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that
Title VII does not preempt California's anti-affirmative action, Proposition 209: "Section 708 of
Title VII provides: 'Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person
from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present of future law of any
State or political subdivision of a State, other than any such law which purports to require or
permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice under this
subchapter.' That is all Title VII pre-empts. Proposition 209 does not remotely purport to require
the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice under Title VII.").
36
For challenges to non-remedial affirmative action under Title VII, see, for example,
Lomack v. City of Newark, 463 F.3d 303, 310 (3d Cir. 2006) (rejecting race-based transfers to
achieve diversity within firehouses because diversity was not central to the firefighting mission);
Schurr v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc., 196 F.3d 486, 497 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding, pre-Taxman, that
Title VII affirmative action must be remedial and that there was no finding of historical or
current discrimination in the industry or job category); Cunico v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60, 917
F.2d 431, 437 n.3 (10th Cir. 1990) (rejecting, in the context of teacher workforce diversity, "a
diverse, multi-racial faculty and staff' and "equity for all individuals" as the basis for affirmative
action and instead limiting the school to remedial purposes it could not satisfy).
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
There are other possible explanations for the absence of challenges to contemporary
corporate affirmative action programs. Perhaps few private-sector employers actually engage in
37
38

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2015

7

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 118, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 7

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

8

[Vol. 118

O'Connor explained the corporate importance of educational diversity as
follows:
These benefits are not theoretical but real, as major American
businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today's
increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through
exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and
viewpoints.

. .

. What is more, high-ranking retired officers and

civilian leaders of the United States military assert that,
"[b]ased on [their] decades of experience," a "highly qualified,
racially diverse officer corps . . . is essential to the military's

ability to fulfill its principle mission to provide national
security.". . . The primary sources for the Nation's officer
corps are the service academies and the Reserve Officers
Training Corps (ROTC), the latter comprising students already
admitted to participating colleges and universities. . . . At
present, "the military cannot achieve an officer corps that is
both highly qualified and racially diverse unless the service
academies and the ROTC used limited race-conscious
recruiting and admissions policies." . . . To fulfill its mission,

the military "must be selective in admissions for training and
education for the officer corps, and it must train and educate a
highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps in a racially
diverse educational setting." . . . We agree that "[i]t requires

only a small step from this analysis to conclude that our
country's other most selective institutions must remain both
diverse and selective."
We have repeatedly acknowledged the overriding
importance of preparing students for work and citizenship ....
For this reason, the diffusion of knowledge and opportunity
through public institutions of higher education must be
accessible to all individuals regardless of race or ethnicity. 9
In the years immediately after the Court upheld diversity-based affirmative
action in higher education in Grutter, numerous commentators argued that
Justice O'Connor's opinion embracing the diversity rationale for universities
was so dependent on the asserted needs of the business community (and the
military) that, essentially, the Court's rationale bootstrapped existing corporate

affirmative action any more (at least beyond "soft" forms, like outreach, that have never been
considered actionable under Title VII). It is also possible that employers who are using the
vocabulary of "diversity" to defend their affirmative action plans are, in fact, fully compliant
with the requirements that Weber and Johnson set forth for remedial affirmative action.
Exploring these explanations would require empirical work beyond the scope of this Article.
39
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-31 (citations omitted).
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diversity strategies into newfound legality.4 0 Perhaps that was what Justice
O'Connor intended. There is a long tradition in affirmative action case law of
business-minded conservatives providing the deciding vote. Moderate businessoriented Republicans played a key role in the passage of Title VII, and they
were particularly concerned to maintain as much management discretion as
possible. 4 1 Perhaps that business-oriented historical voice will always find an
echo on the Court, leading it to take corporate America at its word about its
need to be race- and gender-conscious to achieve "diversity" in support of its
economic bottom line.
But I would not count on it-not as a reading of Justice O'Connor and
not as a prediction about the current Court.
A. ReadingJustice O'Connor
When parsing Justice O'Connor's dicta in Grutter, we must also pay
attention to Justice O'Connor's opinion concurring in the judgment in Johnson.
There, she expressly rejected the following statement by Justice Stevens of the
pro-business position:
The logic of antidiscrimination legislation requires that judicial
constructions of Title VII leave "breathing room" for employer
initiatives to benefit members of minority groups. If Title VII
had never been enacted, a private employer would be free to
hire members of minority groups for any reason that might
seem sensible from a business or a social point of view. The

Cynthia L. Estlund, PuttingGrutter to Work: Diversity, IntegrationandAffirmative Action
in the Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2005). Estlund's article is thoughtful and
widely cited. The employer shift to diversity "put employers on a collision course with the
precedents on which they would need to base a defense of their hiring policies," but Grutter
helped because of its "valence and atmospherics," its reliance on corporate and military briefs,
and its seeming endorsement of "the 'business case for diversity itself."' Id. at 14-20. Ultimately,
however, Estlund argues that business affirmative action practices would be better grounded in a
workplace "civic [integrationist] imperative" than on profit-oriented business self-interest. Id. at
26. Even then, she is not certain that businesses would or should be allowed to "assert broad
societal interests to justify overriding civil rights claims." Id. at 27. Perhaps only universities
should be able to do so, in which case, she notes, Grutter leaves the business case for diversity no
better off. Id. at 30-31; see also Cynthia L. Estlund, Workplace Democracyfor the Twenty-First
Century? Rethinking a Norm of Worker Voice in the Wake of the Corporate Diversity
Juggernaut, 14 NEV. L.J. 309, 318 (2014) (concluding that "[t]he corporate commitment to
diversity . . goes beyond what the 'colorblind' version of the law permits" but is supported by
alternative rationales).
41
In Weber, the Steelworkers' successful strategy was to go for Justice Stewart's vote by
stressing the thread in the legislative history that was protective of managerial discretion (all
heavily influenced by Everett Dirksen and the drive for bipartisan support). See Deborah C.
Malamud, The Story of United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, in EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION STORIES 173, 210-21 (Joel W. Friedman ed., 2006).
40
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Court's opinion in Weber reflects the same approach; the
opinion relied heavily on legislative history indicating that
Congress intended that traditional management prerogatives be
left undisturbed to the greatest extent possible.42
Justice O'Connor rejected this view, arguing that it is inconsistent with the fact
that "Congress intended to prohibit practices that operate to discriminate
against the employment opportunities of nonminorities as well as minorities."43
Justice O'Connor was prepared to find the right balance only where "the
employer [can] point to evidence sufficient to establish a firm basis for
believing that remedial action is required, and that a statistical imbalance
sufficient for a Title VII prima facie case" exists." She drew that standard from
her opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment the previous
Term in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, a constitutional law
employment affirmative- action case. In Wygant, Justice O'Connor also made
clear that she was no fan of basing affirmative action on "role model"-type
theories or on the non-remedial benchmark the school district relied upon in
litigating its case (i.e., the comparison between the racial composition of the
district's teacher workforce and its student body).46 Wygant was a constitutional
case, and Johnson was not, but that did not make a difference in Johnson.
Justice O'Connor did not draw sharp lines between constitutional and Title VII
standards in affirmative action cases. In Johnson, she could have created a
distinct Title VII standard (one perhaps less strict that the constitutional
standard), but instead she harmonized Title VII with the Constitution. Title
VII's standards for workforce affirmative action are, she explained, "entirely
consistent" with those of the Constitution. 7 In both, what is needed is
warranting "remedial action.' 9 "Because
"evidence of past discrimination
the same competing concerns, I
to
reconcile
attempt
both Wygant and Weber

42

Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 645 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring).

43

Id. at 649 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

4

Id. at 650-51.

476 U.S. 267, 290 (1986). Wygant involved a school district's collective bargaining
agreement that provided for seniority-based layoffs, except that the percentage of minority
personnel laid off could not exceed the current percentage of employed minority personnel. Id. at
270-71. The Court reversed the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and held
that preference given to minority teachers had to be based on past discrimination. Id. at 272-73.
46
Id. at 284-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor did not address the specific
question of whether faculty diversity was a permissible consideration, noting that the question
had not been raised or considered below. Id. at 288.
47
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 651 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
45

48
49

Id. at 651.
Id. at 650.
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see little justification for the adoption of different standards for affirmative
action [in employment] under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause., 50
One might say that the Justice O'Connor of Wygant was not yet on
board with the diversity rationale for affirmative action in higher education, and
that once she signed on to her version of the diversity rationale in Grutter, she
threw her concurrences in Johnson and Wygant out the window. But
O'Connor's opinions can be internally reconciled by taking her at her word that
Grutter, like Regents v. Bakke,5' is grounded on the special First Amendment
status of universities. In Grutter, O'Connor was careful to reiterate the fact that,
in Bakke, "Justice Powell grounded his analysis in the academic freedom that
'long has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment."' 52 In
deferring to the law school's judgment that "diversity is essential to its
educational mission," O'Connor noted that:
Our holding today is in keeping with our tradition of giving a
degree of deference to a university's academic decisions,
within constitutionally prescribed limits.
We have long recognized that, given the important
purpose of public education and the expansive freedoms of
speech and thought associated with the university environment,
universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional
tradition. In announcing the principle of student body diversity
as a compelling state interest, Justice Powell invoked our cases
recognizing a constitutional dimension, grounded in the First
53
Amendment, of educational autonomy ....
One need not read Grutter as bootstrapping corporate practices into
legality. The better reading-the reading more consistent with her
jurisprudence-is that, in Grutter, Justice O'Connor allowed universities to use
diversity-based affirmative action so that corporations do not have to. Grutter
assures employers a racially diverse pool of elite college graduates from which
they can hire purely "on the [traditional] merits" (with "diversity" not counting
as "merit")-except insofar as Johnson allows them to use affirmative action
for remedial purposes.

50

51
52

Id. at 652.
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 324 (2003) (quoting Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,

314 (1978)).
5
Id. at 328-29.
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B. Reading Justice Kennedy
In any event, in the years since Grutter, the Court has grown less
friendly to race-diversity-based affirmative action in higher education.5 4 Justice
O'Connor is gone; the outer limit of the law's tolerance for affirmative action is
now what Justice Kennedy says it is. Justice Kennedy dissented in Grutter, and
while he holds to stare decisis, he does so without enthusiasm. Furthermore, as
we shall see, Justice Kennedy's jurisprudence in this field makes clear his
preference for race-neutral remedies, even in the case of proven violations of
antidiscrimination laws.
In ParentsInvolved v. Seattle School DistrictNo. 1,55 Justice Kennedy
concurred in Chief Justice Roberts's (writing for the majority) strict view of the
circumstances in which race-conscious pupil assignment can permissibly be
viewed as "remedial." According to Roberts, the mere presence of
"segregation" in a community is not enough to support such pupil assignment;
rather, the segregation must be the result of intentional discrimination. 56 The
case turned on the distinction between "de jure" and "de facto" segre ation in
the K-12 educational setting, a distinction with a rich history.5 Justice
Kennedy joined in the section of the opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts
wrote, "[w]e have emphasized that the harm being remedied by mandatory
desegregation plans is the harm that is traceable to segregation, and that 'the
Constitution is not violated by racial imbalance in the schools, without
5 Weber and Johnson also use the term "segregation"-they limit
more."'s
affirmative action to remeding a "manifest ... imbalance[] in traditionally
segregated job categories." As shown above, the concept of "segregation"

54
All of these cases concern race, for which the constitutional standard is strict scrutiny.
Gender, which is subject to intermediate scrutiny, presents a different picture. The prevailing
view is that affirmative action is subject to the same level of scrutiny as "ordinary"
discrimination-which, for gender-based affirmative action, is intermediate, and for class-based
affirmative action, is rationality review. See, e.g., Ensley Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Seibels, 31 F.3d
1548, 1579 (11th Cir. 1994). See generally Ajmel Quereshi, The ForgottenRemedy: A Legal and
Theoretical Defense ofIntermediate Scrutiny for Gender-BasedAffirmative Action Programs, 21
AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 797 (2013).
5
56

551 U.S. 701 (2007).
Id. at 720-21.

5
See id. at 736. Chief Justice Roberts chided the dissent for supposedly ignoring this
distinction as well as the lower court's determination that segregation was "de facto" rather than
"de jure." Id. For more on the distinction, see Keyes v. School DistrictNo. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208
(1973) ("The differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called de facto
segregation . . . is purpose or intent to segregate.").
58
ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 721 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 n.14
(1977)).
5
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197, 208 (1979); see also Johnson v. Transp.
Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 620 (1987).
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was linked in those cases to a history of employment discrimination. If that is
the case, Parents Involved suggests that Justice Kennedy would be open to
arguments that the racial imbalances in today's workforce are no longer due to
the patterns of discrimination the Court found present in Weber and Johnson.
One might think it promising, in that light, that Justice Kennedy
responded to the lack of a legally sufficient remedial justification for
affirmative action in Parents Involved by endorsing the migration of the
diversity rationale for affirmative action from higher education to K-12
education. But the type of consideration of race he was prepared to
countenance in Parents Involved was quite limited. In rejecting explicit racebased student assignment (which was at issue in that case), he could simply
have faulted the Seattle school district for assigning certain pupils solely on the
basis of race and have required them to use race as no more than a "plus factor"
in a holistic assignment process (as the analogy to Grutter would have
required). But that is not what he did. Instead, the only techniques he endorsed
were "race-conscious measures [that] address the problem in a general way," 6 0
rather than ones that directly involve the selection of students. Kennedy
explained:
School boards may pursue the goal of bringing together
students of diverse backgrounds and races through other
means, including strategic site selection of new schools;
drawing attendance zones with general recognition of the
demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for
special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a targeted
fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other
statistics by race.6 1
In Fisher, the Court, with Justice Kennedy writing, reiterated Grutter's
approval of diversity as a compelling interest for purposes of higher-education
student admissions.6 2 At the same time, it noted both that "there is
disagreement about whether Grutter was consistent with the principles of equal
protection in approving this compelling interest in diversity" and that the
parties had not asked the Court to "revisit that aspect of Grutter'sholding."63 A
reminder that a settled issue remains controversial, paired with a tacit invitation
to parties in a future case to request reconsideration, is hardly a ringing
endorsement. The holding of Fisher, that universities must exhaust race-neutral
alternatives before considering race, places additional burdens on the pursuit of

60
61
62

63

ParentsInvolved, 551 U.S. at 788-89 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 789.
133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
Id. at 2419.
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"diversity" even within the higher-education sphere.64 Fisherthus hardly reads
like an endorsement of race-consciousness in pursuit of corporate diversity.
More recently, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court in Schuette v.
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action,6 5 cleared the pathway for state antiaffirmative action constitutional initiatives, including the Michigan initiative
that rendered Grutter a dead letter for the University of Michigan. To achieve
that end, the Court in Schuette trimmed back on previous case law that
restricted states' abilities to insist that access to racial remedies be governed at
the statewide level.66 These were cases that dated back to the core period of the
Court's most heightened concern with the problem of racial justice. The Court
did not hesitate to adopt a reading of those cases that came pretty close to
stripping them of stare decisis value. The high-minded dicta in Justice
O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Grutter, in which she arguably not merely
deferred to, but in fact adopted, the university's insights about the societal need
for corporate and political elites trained in diverse environments, plays no part
in Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Schuette. It is for the people to
decide that issue, where state law permits, through the politically volatile (and
generally elite-unfriendly) initiative process.
Finally, Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Texas Department
of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.,67
again reflects the centrality of race-neutrality in his jurisprudence. In Inclusive
Communities, the Court upheld the availability of the disparate impact cause of
action6 in cases arising under the Fair Housing Act but cautioned that
constitutional concerns would arise "if disparate-impact liability ... caused
race to be used and considered in a pervasive and explicit manner to justify
governmental or private actions that, in fact, tend to perpetuate race-based
considerations rather than move beyond them." 69 Because of these concerns,
the Court stated that in fashioning remedies for proven disparate-impact
violations, courts that choose to go beyond merely eliminating the offending

6
The Court has granted certiorari a second time in the Fisherlitigation in order to review
the Fifth Circuit's application of strict scrutiny on remand. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 758 F.3d 633
(5th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 2888 (June 29, 2015).
65
134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
66
See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982); Hunter v. Erickson, 393
U.S. 385 (1969).
67
135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
68
"Disparate impact" is "[t]he adverse effect of a facially neutral practice (esp. an
employment practice) that nonetheless discriminates against persons because of their race, sex,
national origin, age, or disability and that is not justified by business necessity." Disparate
Impact, BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). For the disparate impact cause of action's
origins in Title VII, see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971). For the Court's
rejection of the disparate impact cause of action for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, see
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
69
Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2524.
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70
practice "should strive" to use "race-neutral means." "When setting their
larger goals, local housing authorities may choose to foster diversity and
combat racial isolation with race-neutral tools, and mere awareness of race in
attempting to solve the problems facing inner cities does not doom that
endeavor at the outset." 7 What will doom them, the Court suggests, is adopting
expressly race-consciousness remedies-even in the face of proven violations
of antidiscrimination law. 72
In sum, Justice Kennedy has adopted a jurisprudence of race-neutrality
as the preferred mechanism for addressing the twin issues of race
discrimination and racial "isolation" (i.e., de facto segregation) in American
life. Whatever Justice O'Connor might have had in mind in Grutter, there is
every reason to believe that Justice Kennedy would reject the transformation of
the Weber/Johnson model of race-conscious affirmative action into a
mechanism for assuring the "diversity" of corporate America.

IV. THINKING ABOUT THE FUTURE

If today's Supreme Court did return to the issue of Title VII affirmative
action, what would happen? In this Court, there would likely be considerable
hostility even to "traditional" remedial affirmative action-let alone to any
"diversity"-based extension of it. This is not to say that the Court will abandon
stare decisis-it generally does not, especially not where statutes are at issue.
But there would certainly be some strong advocacy for doing precisely that.
The following sections will consider both the changing circumstances that
might lead the court to reject "traditional" remedial affirmative action and the
impediments to any extension of the doctrine.
A. Seven Critiquesof "Traditional"Remedial Affirmative Action
First, there is the matter of statutory-interpretation methodology. Weber
was the modern poster child for a style of statutory interpretation that is under
great pressure nowadays: the Weber Court found the letter of the law "absurd"
in light of its spirit and took a "dynamic" approach to making the 1964 statute
meet the needs of the times. Neither this kind of "purposivism" nor this kind of
73
"dynamic statutory interpretation" is popular in the current Supreme Court.
The Court in Weber relied heavily on the Holy Trinity Church v. United

70

Id.

71

Id. at 2525.

72

Id.

73

For a comprehensive review of modalities of statutory interpretation and their discontents,

WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., STATUTES, REGULATION, AND
LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF STATUTES (2014).

see
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StateS74 case's edict that "[i]t is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the
letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit
nor within the intention of its makers."75 Holy Trinity has become a laugh-line
among textualists. One could rewrite Weber in a more textualist fashion, based
on today's statutory interpretation fashions. But the way in which the majority
opinion is written makes it a ready target for reexamination. 77
Defenders of Weber insist that the case was rightly decided because
using Title VII's antidiscrimination principle as an obstacle to employers'
voluntary remedial efforts would be "ironic" 78 (or, a better buzzword for
today's statutory-interpretation practitioners, "absurd"79 ). Even from my
standpoint as a hardened "purposivist" in my approach to statutory
interpretation, this is a weak argument. Title VII stepped into an otherwise
unregulated field-private-sector employment discrimination-and subjected it
to regulation. It should have been no surprise that the loss of employer freedom
to discriminate might prove to be a double-edged sword. When I teach statutory
interpretation, I use Weber as a cautionary tale about the fact that purposivist
statutory interpretation done right recognizes that there are hierarchies of
purposes and congressionally-established limits to the acceptable methods for

74

143 U.S. 457 (1892).
75 Id. at 459.

Justice Brennan might have offered an interpretation of the word "discrimination"
in the
statute to mean "invidious discrimination," which he might then have endeavored to defend in
ways acceptable to a modem-day textualist. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 100-04 (4th ed.
2007).
n
This is not to say that today's Supreme Court slavishly adheres to the "plain meaning" of
statutes. In King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015), the Court relied on the "context and
structure of the Act ... to depart from what would otherwise be the most natural reading of the
pertinent statutory phrase" in order to avoid a reading of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (ACA) that the Court held would "destroy" the health insurance markets that the statute
aimed to "improve." Id. at 2495-96. Justice Roberts's opinion for the majority provoked a
spirited dissent, in which Justice Scalia accused the majority of having performed "somersaults
of statutory interpretation" in support of a law the Court "favors" and "is prepared to do whatever
it takes to uphold and assist." Id. at 2507 (Scalia, J., dissenting). As a purposivist myself, I would
happily deem King a purposivist rather than a textualist decision (although the Court did not so
admit). But however far King went, it did not go as far as Weber did. The majority in King did
not rely on Holy Trinity, purporting instead to use well-established textualist tools (albeit ones
that go beyond "plain meaning" at the level of the phrase or sentence). Furthermore, the Court
made a far more compelling case in King than it did in Weber that a contrary ruling would have
substantially undermined the statutory scheme.
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 204 (1979) ("It would be ironic indeed if a
law triggered by a Nation's concern over centuries of racial injustice . .. constituted the first
legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional
patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy.").
79
Even textualists are willing to reject "absurd" readings of statutes. See, e.g., John F.
Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REv. 2387, 2419-31 (2003).
76
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their accomplishment. As Hart and Sacks wrote in their famous primer on
statutory interpretation, "[p]urposes . .. may exist in hierarchies or
constellations. E.g. (to give a very simple illustration), to do this only so far as
possible without doing that."80 The Court in Weber essentially treated the
"purpose" of protecting management discretion as co-equal to the statute's core
anti-discrimination purpose, which I think is out of line with sound purposivist
interpretive practice.
Second, we must consider the social and political context out of which
Weber emerged. The EEOC and the Department of Justice embraced
affirmative action because the strategy of waiting for color-blind legal
principles to do their work was too slow to be an effective societal response to
the pressures of urban race riots and militant civil rights activism that had the
problem of employment discrimination squarely in view.8 1 We have recently
seen a rise in mass civil rights activism, but its main focus now is the criminal
82
justice system.
Third, it is not merely the social/political context that has changed. So
has the identity of the beneficiaries of affirmative action. Critics (and even
some supporters) of race-based affirmative action have noted that, at least as it
is practiced in the higher-education setting, race-based affirmative action is no
longer primarily helping what commentators have called "legacy" or
"ascendant" blacks (native-born African Americans) but is instead
disproportionately helping the children of African and Caribbean immigrants
and mixed-race African Americans. Others have noted that it is primarily
84
middle-class blacks who are helped by affirmative action in higher education.

so

HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE

MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1377 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,

1994).
81
See JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: POLITICS,
CULTURE,
AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA 127-33 (1996).
82
See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE

race-related issues specific to African-American
males and mass incarceration in the United States); BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY: A STORY
OF JUSTICE AND REDEMPTION (2014). Most recently, mass protests surrounding police violence
against blacks in Ferguson, Missouri, and elsewhere have riveted the nation and led to the
#blacklivesmatter social movement. For a retrospective of the events that put Ferguson in the
spotlight and spurred a nationwide discussion on race relations, see Ferguson: A Shooting that
Caused the Nation to Shudder, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/08/08/us/ferguson-a-shooting-that-caused-the-nation-to-shudder.html.
83
See, e.g., Kevin Brown & Jeannine Bell, Demise of the Talented Tenth: Affirmative Action
and the Increasing Underrepresentationof Ascendant Blacks at Selective Higher Educational
Institutions, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1229 (2008); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Admission of Legacy
Blacks, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1141 (2007).
84
See, e.g., Richard H. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, 88 DENV. U. L. REV.
631 (2011). For a reflection of this issue in the Fisher oral argument, see Transcript of Oral
Argument at 38-45, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345), in which
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012) (discussing
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The same would be true, as well, of corporate affirmative action in so far as
these corporations are recruiting from elite universities. Furthermore, the
global-marketplace part of the corporate diversity justification would tend to
put a high premium on the hiring of candidates from immigrant backgrounds.
There is no reason to think the Court would be particularly sympathetic to
using affirmative action in a way that favors recent immigrants. The globalmarketplace approach would also put a particularly low premium on nativeborn African Americans.85 This consciousness of a mismatch between the core
societal-discrimination story underlying Weber and current practice might well
surface if the Court were to reconsider race-based affirmative action under Title
VII.
Fourth, the Supreme Court is not likely to care about any appearances
of "racism" that abandoning affirmative action in employment would create.
The Court's decision in Shelby County v. Holder86 to abandon the preclearance
provisions of the 1965 Voting Rights Act shows a Court perfectly capable of
deciding that extraordinary measures that were once perceived as necessary
have outlived the circumstances that justified them. In this Court, dynamic
statutory interpretation is not a one-way ratchet. Nor should it be, in the view of
its leading academic proponent, William Eskridge, Jr., who argues that
decisions, including Weber, are properly subject to reconsideration on
pragmatic grounds.
Fifth, to the extent that Weber and Johnson grew out of the Court's
sympathy for the predicament of employers who were likely to be faced with
pattern-or-practice or disparate-impact suits if they were not able to self-cure
by using affirmative action, times have changed. Weber arose when systemic

Justices Alito and Kennedy express skepticism about the argument that race-based affirmative
action is needed as an add-on to Texas's "top 10 percent plan" in order to make sure that
socioeconomically privileged minorities are adequately represented within the university's
minority population.
85
See Estlund, PuttingGrutter to Work, supra note 40.
86
133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
87
Shelby County also shows that this Court is not likely to be persuaded that the failure of
Congress to legislate a contemporary solution to the problems faced by corporations in achieving
diverse workforces means that it should allow older, unsuitable methods to remain in place until
Congress acts.
88
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 203-04 (1994)
(arguing that Weber should be open for reconsideration, but only on the basis of "critical
arguments that Weber has contributed to racial polarization and resentment and not to increased
economic opportunities for racial minorities. Although the more sophisticated analysts still
consider that affirmative action yields beneficial results ... the Weber debate needs to focus on
what the consequences of workplace affirmative action have actually been... . If dynamic
statutory interpretation is to have any positive payoff, interpreters need to test their own
preconceptions ... against the operation of their interpretation in the world.").
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litigation was at its high point. 89 There are fewer and fewer successful systemic
suits, and the Court's decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,90 which went
a long way towards closing off some of the more creative theories underlying
those suits, contributes to keeping the pressure off.
Sixth, the Court-again, through Justice Kennedy-signaled its
discomfort with race-consciousness in the Title VII setting in Ricci v.
DeStefano.9 ' Ricci made it harder for employers to use race-conscious measures
to self-cure in the face of potential disparate-impact violations, adopting from
Justice Powell's plurality opinion in Wygant the rule that such efforts count as
remedial and are therefore permissible "only where there is 'a strong basis in
evidence' that the remedial actions were necessary" to prevent or cure a Title
VII violation.92 Ricci did not involve an affirmative action plan and did not
address the Weber/Johnson standard for affirmative action plans. By its terms,
then, Ricci left the option of adopting a full-blown remedial affirmative action
plan available in appropriate circumstances (i.e., manifest imbalance in a
traditionally segregated job category) for those employers capable of imposing
such a plan unilaterally or through collective bargaining. 9 3 Indeed, the Court
noted that the "strong basis in evidence" standard "leaves ample room for
employers' voluntary compliance efforts, which are essential to the statutory
scheme and to Congress's efforts to eradicate workplace discrimination," citing

Weber was decided soon after Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), in which
the Court sharply curtailed the particular litigation threat that had shaped the Steelworkers'
experiments with affirmative action-namely, the disparate-impact challenge to race-neutral
seniority systems. See Malamud, supra note 41. Nowhere in Weber did the Justices note the
significance of Teamsters. In any event, other forms of disparate-impact and pattern-or-practice
litigation remained robust, and critics of systemic litigation have long complained that it tends to
propel employers towards affirmative action. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 463
(1982) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("By its holding today, the Court may force employers either to
eliminate tests or rely on expensive, job-related, testing procedures .... For state and local
governmental employers with limited funds, the practical effect of today's decision may well be
the adoption of simple quota hiring.").
90
131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). Wal-Mart involved a class-action suit by Wal-Mart employees
who claimed to have been discriminated against on the basis of sex. Id at 2547. The Court
rejected the argument that a policy granting substantial discretion to local managers amounted to
a corporate culture or policy of discrimination. Id. at 2554-55. The holding undercut the rationale
for many large systemic discrimination claims.
91
557 U.S. 557 (2009); see Patrick S. Shin & Mitu Gulati, Showcasing Diversity, 89 N.C. L.
REv. 1017 (2011) (arguing that, although Ricci was not an affirmative action case, it "should
chasten any expectation that the Court will take its next available opportunity to extend the
diversity rationale for affirmative action").
92
Ricci, 557 U.S. at 582 (citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989)
(quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986))).
See United States v. Brennan, 650 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2011) (drawing a distinction between
9
affirmative action plans permitted by Weber/Johnson and impermissible individualized raceconscious remedies barred by Ricci).
89
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an affirmative action case. But the mismatch between the strictness of Ricci
and the laxness of Weber as to the preconditions for remedial raceconsciousness creates a tension in the law that a future Court might well aim to
cure by cutting back on remedial affirmative action. That mismatch is made
even clearer by Inclusive Communities, in which the Court suggested that raceconscious remedies would raise constitutional concerns even in cases with fully
proven disparate-impact violations. Stare decisis is often set aside when
subsequent cases are in tension with early precedents.9 6 In the case of the
Weber/Johnson model, tensions abound.
Finally, one might read the Court's Schuette decision as reflecting the
view that affirmative action is sufficiently problematic that it ought to require
high-level political control. The Court was clearly uncomfortable with locking
into place the control that individual universities exercise over affirmative
action decision making. The radical decentralization of voluntary affirmative
action in the employment setting might, for some Justices, be a strike against it
in the contemporary political environment.
B. Roadblocks to Going Beyond "Remedy" to "Diversity"
Let us assume that stare decisis holds at least as to traditional
remedially-based voluntary affirmative action. Members of the Court who view
the traditional doctrine as illegitimate would be loath to extend it, just as a
matter of general principle. But I suspect they would have other, more specific
objections as well.
On the question of statutory interpretation, the "absurdity" argument
upon which Weber relied is far weaker for diversity-based affirmative action
than for remedial affirmative action. Regulatory requirements routinely
constrain corporate profit seeking, and the core purpose of Title VII was not the
increase in employer profitability. There's no irony here.

94
Ricci, 557 U.S. at 583 (citing Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of
Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986) (involving an affirmative-action consent decree)).
9
In Inclusive Communities, the Court sought to minimize the extent of race-consciousness
in disparate-impact remediation as an exercise in constitutional avoidance. The Court has, in fact,
never held that strict scrutiny applies to court-ordered race-conscious remedies for proven cases
of discrimination. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 163 (1987) (noting that "although
this Court has consistently held that some elevated level of scrutiny is required when a racial or
ethnic distinction is made for remedial purposes, it has yet to reach consensus on the appropriate
constitutional analysis"); see also LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 1, at 2736 ("Few courts
have addressed the issue of race-conscious, court-ordered relief," but "nearly every court to have
done so has applied a strict scrutiny standard.").
96
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992) (holding that
stare decisis can be rejected when "related principles of law have so far developed as to have left
the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine").
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One of the key requirements of Weber and Johnson is that affirmative
action plans be "temporary"-they are supposed to set reasonable goals that
can be met in some foreseeable future and (in one of the less-sensible aspects of
the case) can be used to "attain" but not to "maintain" racial (etc.) balance.97
Grutter, too, pressed on the temporariness issue by declaring the expectation
(something less than a requirement, something more than a hope?) that
affirmative action in higher education will not be needed in 25 years.98 But
there is no reason to believe that the American workforce will, any time soon,
mirror corporate America's diverse global consumer base. If that is the
endpoint, there is no end in sight. To a limited extent, employers can use Title
VII's bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense to justify diversitybased hiring on a permanent basis. But the BFOQ defense has its limitations;
the most important being that it is unavailable for discrimination based on race
and color. Courts have been prepared to turn a blind eye to BFOQ problems in
policing and corrections9 9 and would likely do so in theatrical casting if anyone
ever brought such a case. But when the reason is customer preference, or some
abstract notion that better decision making comes out of racially diverse
working groups, the no-race-BFOQ prohibition might be more robust.
Even where race matters, this is a Court that likes stealth. The highereducation diversity rationale is now, post-Fisher, clearly tied to a requirement
that universities make genuine efforts to attain racial diversity through raceneutral means.' 0 0 True, race neutrality is a requirement of strict scrutiny, and
strict scrutiny is a constitutional rather than a statutory doctrine. But the Court
has drawn constitutional limitations into Title VII analysis before (see, for
example, Ricci and Inclusive Communities) and might well do it again. In the
constitutional setting, the Court has required exhaustion of race-neutral means
because it believes that candidate-specific race-conscious decision making is
socially dangerous and personally demeaning. A future Supreme Court that so

United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
9
See, e.g., Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding, under the Equal
Protection Clause, race-conscious hiring of correction boot-camp sergeants); Petit v. City of
Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111 (7th Cir. 2003) (extending Wittmer to urban policing). For the
suggestion that this rationale would not carry over into non-law-enforcement Title VII private
employment, see Appel et al., supra note 23.
97

9

100 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2433 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("I
have said before [in Gratz] and reiterate here that only an ostrich could regard the supposedly
neutral plans as race unconscious."). Note that there is considerable tension between the Court's
encouragement of the adoption of race-neutral plans for race-conscious reasons in the recent
cases and the Court's earlier holdings that race-conscious measures chosen "'because of,' not
merely 'in spite of,' their racial effects are subject to strict scrutiny." Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). Feeney was a gender case, but its principle is applicable to
race cases as well.
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believes might well impose a race-neutrality requirement on corporate decision
making as well.
One might argue that after all these years of silence (and, perhaps in the
case of Grutter, acquiescence) in the face of the corporate shift to "diversity,"
the Court would be hesitant to ruffle corporate feathers by rejecting a diversity
rationale for corporate affirmative action under Title VII. But this is not a Court
that hesitates to unsettling reliance-based expectations. In ParentsInvolved, the
Court made clear that it was willing to unsettle expectations and practices that
had grown up around previous Supreme Court dicta during years of judicial
silence on issues of key importance. There, school districts had, for decades,
followed dicta in the Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of Education01
case that suggested that school systems were free to voluntarily use raceconscious pupil assignment systems of a sort that courts could order only upon
a finding of "de jure" segregation. 102 The Court announced in ParentsInvolved
that it was simply a mistake for school systems to have so relied.
C. Mitigating Considerations
Let me not be entirely negative here about what would happen if the
Court took on the question of corporate "diversity" based affirmative action
under Title VII.
The Roberts Court is marked by a combination of ideological
conservatism and business conservatism: it has a strong pro-business bent. 103
Such a Court might hesitate before overturning practices that leading
corporations say that they need to be competitive in the global marketplace.
Justice Kennedy is no exception. He wrote the Court's much-maligned opinion
in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,10 4 in which the Court
rejected restrictions on political speech by corporations. In Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., o the Court protected corporations as "free exercisers" of
religion. In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy waxed eloquently about dignity
and "the right to establish one's religious (or nonreligious) self-definition in the
political, civic, and economic life of our larger community"' o-meaning that
corporations, not just persons, are bearers of dignity and a sense of self. That
being said, I doubt that this constitutional enhancement of the societal status of

101

402 U.S. 1 (1971).
Id. at 16.
103
See Adam Liptak, CorporationsFind a Friendin the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (May 4,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/business/pro-business-decisions-are-defining-this2013),
supreme-court.html.
'
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
105
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
106
Id. at 2785 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
102
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the American corporation will be taken far enough to warrant the level of
deference that Bakke and Gruttergave to universities on the diversity question.
Justice Kennedy remains an integrationist. To the extent that corporate
hiring is based on subjective and multi-factor selection criteria, "diversity" in
the corporate setting may operate in an even stealthier manner than does the
"plus factor" of Bakke/Grutter fame, and would thus have very little in
common with the blatant racial classifications the Court accepted in Weber or
those Justice Kennedy rejected in Ricci and Parents Involved. If Justice
Kennedy were to embrace some version of corporate diversity-based
affirmative action, the result would not be an extension of Weber and Johnson.
Rather, it would likely be the harnessing of a wide range of what the Court
deems to be race-neutral mechanisms to achieve race-conscious diversity goals.
V. CONCLUSION

Fortunately for American corporations, conservative public interest
groups are not targeting corporate affirmative action policies. But the silence is
unlikely to last forever, and the time will come for a serious consideration of
contemporary corporate affirmative action policy. When it does, it is by no
means clear that even the remedial affirmative action permitted by Weber and
Johnson will survive. It is even less likely, in my view, that this Court will see
Grutter as creating a safe haven for corporate diversity practice. Even if the
Court permits diversity-based affirmative action under Title VII, it is likely to
harmonize its Title VII and constitutional jurisprudence by requiring the
exhaustion of race-neutral means for achieving race-conscious ends. 10 7 Stealth
will be the new order of the day.

107
The Court will have more to say about the precise contours of that requirement in Fisher v.
Univ. of Tex., 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 2888 (June 29, 2015) (No.
14-981).
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